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Abstract—In modern asset management, portfolio managers
address the multi-account investment decision problem by opti-
mizing each account’s portfolio separately based on the trading
requirements and portfolio constraints of the individual clients.
However, trades associated with the individual accounts are
usually pooled together for execution, therefore amplifying the
level of the so-called market impact on all accounts. If this
aggregate market impact is not considered when each account is
individually optimized, the actual market impact can be severely
under-estimated. Multi-portfolio optimization aims at finding the
optimal rebalancing of the multiple accounts by considering their
joint effects while adhering to account-specific constraints. In this
paper, we first model this phenomenon as a Nash Equilibrium
problem (NEP) and thereafter consider a generalized NEP
(GNEP) for the case where there are global constraints imposed
on all accounts, adopting as a desirable outcome the concept
of Nash Equilibrium (NE). For both game problems, we give
a complete characterization of the NE, including its existence
and uniqueness, and devise various distributed algorithms with
provable convergence. Interestingly, the proposed methodology
heavily hinges on a number of well-known and important signal
processing techniques.
Index Terms—Multi-Portfolio Optimization, Market Impact
Cost, Game Theory, Nash Equilibrium, Socially Optimal Solu-
tion, Convex Optimization, Distributed Algorithms.
I. INTRODUCTION
In financial engineering, the field of portfolio optimization
studies how to allocate funds among a number of risky assets
so that a certain utility function, usually given in terms of a
measure of achieved risk-adjusted return, is maximized. In a
ground-breaking work laying down the foundations of modern
portfolio theory [1], Markowitz introduced the mean-variance
framework and justified that the optimal portfolio should be
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determined based on the trade-off between maximizing the
expected return and minimizing the risk.
Let w be the vector of weights defining the proportion
of wealth allocated among a total number of K assets, and
assume that the return of the k-th asset over a single-period
investment horizon is modeled as a random variable denoted
by rk. Let  = (k)Kk=1 be the vector of expected returns
where k = E[rk], and R = (Rkj)k;j be the positive definite
covariance matrix where Rkj = E [(rk   k)(rj   j)]. In
Markowitz’s mean-variance portfolio optimization framework,
the expected return of the portfolio is Tw while the risk of
the portfolio is wTRw. The latter is based on the intuition
that the prices of highly correlated assets will likely increase
or decrease simultaneously, and it is thus advisable to diversify
the investment choices over a variety of assets in order to ef-
fectively reduce the risk, which is referred to as diversification
principle in finance and investing. Then, considering the trade-
off between the expected return and risk, the optimal portfolio
is the solution to the following problem:
maximize
w
Tw   12wTRw
subject to w 2 W; (1)
where  is a given positive constant specifying the investor’s
level of risk aversion, and W is the set of feasible portfolios
specified by various trading constraints (see Section II). This
formulation reveals that among the portfolios that have the
same risk (expected return, respectively), we should choose the
one with largest expected return (smallest risk, respectively).
Because of its fundamental role in investment science, (1) is
an important source problem in optimization literature [2, 3].
Since the appearance of Markowitz’s work in [1], numerous
generalizations of the classical mean-variance portfolio opti-
mization framework (1) have been proposed to deal with a
variety of practical operating conditions, such as the effect
of transaction cost in the investment performance. Basically,
transaction cost can be explicit, as defined by taxes, market
fees, and brokerage commissions, or implicit, such as bid-ask
spread and market impact cost. Specifically, market impact
refers to the negative effect on the price of an asset when
executing orders that are large relative to the liquidity available
in the market [4–6]. The market impact component represents
the element most largely contributing to uncertainty in trading
cost analysis and portfolio performance measure, and thus
should be properly characterized and incorporated into the
optimization model.
Let TC() be the market impact cost function. The market
impact cost associated with rebalancing from the current
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position w0 to a new position w is given by TC(w   w0).
Then the optimization problem (1) should be revised as
maximize
w
Tw   12wTRw   TC(w  w0)
subject to w 2 W: (2)
In some scenarios, this formulation may still not be sat-
isfactory enough. For example, in a practical framework ac-
commodating multiple accounts, trades of separate accounts
are usually pooled and executed together. As a consequence,
the market impact cost of any single account depends on the
aggregate trades from all accounts [7–10]. Mathematically,
suppose there are N accounts and denote as wn the portfolio
vector of the n-th account, the market impact cost of account n
is TC(
PN
n=1(wn w0n)) rather than TC(wn w0n). In prac-
tice, however, each account is independently optimized while
the market impact from other accounts is naively ignored. The
actual market impact cost, typically much larger than the one
estimated, is subsequently allocated among accounts based on
the proportion of each account’s amount of trading, known as
the pro rata scheme [11]. This under-estimation of the market
impact cost in the naive approach can result in a reduction in
realized returns.
A natural and direct extension of this naive approach is
to explicitly consider in each account’s single portfolio opti-
mization problem the aggregate trades from other accounts.
The resulting multi-portfolio optimization problem is actually
a non-cooperative game problem in disguise, see Section II-B.
The desirable outcome in this context is the Nash Equilibrium
(NE), the most widely used solution in applications of game
theory to economics, at which no account has an incentive to
unilaterally deviate from it [12].
On the other hand, the NE is not efficient in the sense that
it does not necessarily maximize the total welfare over all
accounts, an important social welfare function in microeco-
nomics and widely used in practice, cf. [7, 10, 12–14]. Such a
solution is referred to as a socially optimal solution and it has
been considered first in [7] and further elaborated in [8–10].
In multi-portfolio optimization, a central problem associated
with the optimal solution is the fairness issue [11, 14]. It
is shown in [9, 10] that to achieve social optimality, some
accounts may be forced to sacrifice their own benefits. For
example, when one of the accounts is much larger in size
than the others, smaller accounts can suffer from a shortage
of liquidity. For those small accounts, the socially optimal
solution is not fair in the sense that they can achieve a better
return profile by acting alone such as when pursing the NE
[9, 10]. If the separate accounts belong to individual clients
who care about their own utilities only, those “smaller” clients
may not be satisfied with the socially optimal solution, and this
is where the NE presents itself as a more sensible solution in
the sense of fairness: no client can further maximize his payoff
by unilaterally deviating from the NE.
Although the NE and the socially optimal solution have been
considered in [7, 9], an analytical characterization of these
solutions, such as the existence, uniqueness and algorithms,
was either left open [7] or only partially addressed using
heuristics under a very specific setting [9]. Besides, it is not
clear if the connection between the socially optimal solution
and the NE in [9] is still valid in a general setting.
Another shortcoming of [7, 9] is that a centralized approach
is used to generate optimal trades for all accounts simulta-
neously. However, the variable dimension in this “one-shot”
optimization problem depends on the product of the number
of accounts and the number of assets; thus the computational
cost is excessively expensive when the number of accounts
and/or the number of assets are large. Distributed computation
methods are desirable as they can make use of structure of
the problem in order to decompose a large problem into
a number of smaller problems, which are typically solved
either sequentially or simultaneously. The challenging ques-
tion associated with distributed algorithms is whether they
converge to the optimal solution or not, which is however left
open in literature. The design of distributed algorithms and
convergence analysis becomes more challenging when there
are portfolio constraints imposed on all accounts, which often
arise due to practical considerations, for instance liquidity
limitations indicated by the average daily trading volume
(ADV) for a given asset.
In this paper, we fill these gaps in state-of-the-art theory and
practice of multi-account optimization by rigorously analyzing
the problem in a general setting building on potential game
theory. Specifically, our contributions are the following:
 We show that when all accounts are individually con-
strained, there exists a unique NE. This attractive property in
turn provides an additional justification for the NE: the unique
NE is an outcome that all accounts can predict and agree on.
We derive both synchronous and asynchronous distributed
algorithms with provable convergence: the multi-portfolio op-
timization is decomposed into a number of smaller single-
account problems which can be solved efficiently by existing
infrastructure. The information exchange is maintained at a
very low level: each account only needs an aggregate trading
vector from the preceding iteration, and it does NOT need the
individual trading strategies of other accounts.
 We also consider and analyze the total welfare maximiza-
tion problem. We show that the socially optimal solution may
not be unique, and this could give rise to a fairness issue
among accounts as some accounts may prefer one solution
while other accounts prefer another. Distributed algorithms are
derived to compute the socially optimal solutions efficiently.
When there are global constraints imposed on all accounts,
there exists a unique Variational Equilibrium, a special class
of generalized NE (GNE), and distributed algorithms with
satisfactory convergence properties are proposed.
Connection to signal processing problems: Interestingly,
one can draw a close connection between the multi-portfolio
optimization problem and many seemingly different problems
in signal processing, communication networks, and power
systems; see [15, 16] for Digital Subscriber Line (DSL)
systems, [17, 18, 20] for interference channels, [21, 22] for
cognitive radio (CR) networks, and [23] for power systems.
In DSL systems, subscriber lines are usually bundled to-
gether and they create electromagnetic interference into each
other, thus causing crosstalk noise [15, 16]. In this context,
crosstalk noise plays a similar role as market impact in multi-
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portfolio optimization problem. A similar effect also happens
in interference channels [17, 18, 20].
In CR networks, secondary users (SU) can coexist with
primary users (PU) provided that the interference generated
by the SUs is tolerable for the PUs. If SUs naively transmit
without considering the interference temperature constraints,
they would generate considerable interference to PUs [21, 22].
As a result, neither the SUs nor the PUs can achieve the target
transmission rate. This is similar to the ADV (considered in
Section V) that all accounts together have to obey in multi-
portfolio optimization.
In a smart grid power system, different consumers are
interconnected by the price of the electricity [23]. In particular,
the price of electricity dynamically depends on the aggregate
consumption from all consumers. If one simply ignores the
existence of other consumers, the estimate price of electricity
is smaller than the actual price, and this may lead to excessive
consumption and thus a much higher cost. In this context,
the consumption of electricity plays a similar role as market
impact in the multi-portfolio optimization problem.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II,
we introduce the multi-portfolio problem, and model it as a
game and a total welfare maximization problem. In Section
III, we characterize the NE and the socially optimal solu-
tion including existence and uniqueness, and develop various
distributed algorithms in Section IV. Section V deals with a
generalized NEP (GNEP) where all accounts are subject to
global constraints as well. Numerical results are presented in
Section VI and conclusions are drawn in Section VII.
Notation: Scalars, vectors, and matrices are denoted by x,
x, and X, respectively. xk is the k-th block component of x
and xk is the k-th element of x. The eigenvalues of X are
denoted as (X), with max(X) and min(X) representing
the largest and smallest eigenvalue, respectively. max(X)
denotes the largest singular value of X. en is a unit vector
where the n-th entry is 1. In is the n  n identity matrix
and Jn is a n  n matrix with all entries 1. X 
Y denotes
the Kronecker product of X and Y; diag(X;Y) is a block
diagonal matrix withX andY on the diagonal in a descending
order; diag() is a diagonal matrix with diagonal vector .
[x]
+
= max(x;0) and [x]  = max( x;0) is the positive and
negative decomposition of x, respectively. Note that [x]+  0
and [x]   0. hx;yi and xTy are used interchangeably to
denote the inner product between x and y.
II. PROBLEM MODEL AND FORMULATIONS
A. Mean-variance utility function and constraints
We analyze the multi-portfolio optimization problem under
the mean-variance framework (1)-(2). Specifically, the market
impact cost function TC(w) is modeled as
TC(w) =


[w]
+
; c+(w)

+


[w]
 
; c (w)

(3)
where [w]+ ([w] ) is the buy (sell) vector, and c+ (w)
(c (w)) is the market impact price function for buys (sells)
giving the cost per unit traded for each asset.
For the market impact price function c+(w), we assume
that it is separable among assets [4, 7, 11, 14], i.e., c+(w) =
(c+k (wk))
K
k=1, and c
+
k (wk) = 

+
kk([wk]
+
)p with 0:5  p  1
[4, 7], where 
+ is a positive diagonal matrix representing
market impact coefficients; the modeling is similar for sells.
We assume the usual choice p = 1: this linear market impact
price function is one of the most fundamental models and has
been justified in a number of works, see [4–7, 9, 11, 14, 24].
In the presence of multiple accounts, the market impact
price function depends on the aggregate trade from all ac-
counts [9], i.e., c+(w1; : : : ;wN ) = 
+(
PN
n=1[wn]
+), and
the market impact cost for each account is proportional to their
individual trade amount (the pro rata scheme [11]). Under this
consideration, the utility function for account n is1
un(wn;w n) = Twn   1
2
nw
T
nRwn
  1
2


wn  w0n
+
;
+
XN
m=1

wm  w0m
+
  1
2


wn  w0n
 
;
 
XN
m=1

wm  w0m
 
;
(4)
where w n = (wm)m 6=n represents the strategies of account
n’s competitors, i.e., all accounts except account n. Since the
mean-variance framework focuses on a single-period invest-
ment, we assume that , R, , 
+( ) are fixed [11, 24].
As in (1)-(2), the feasible trading strategy w is in a closed
and convex constraint set W . In general, these portfolio con-
straints may consist of two categories: individual constraints
and global constraints. They together make sure that the
strategies in each account’s constraint set are not only feasible
for the particular account but also feasible in the market.
Individual constraints:
 Holding constraint: To reduce risk, a portfolio should
not exhibit large concentrations in any specific asset. Minimal
and maximal holdings can be controlled by constraints of this
form: ln  wn  un.
 Long-only constraint (no short-selling constraint): In the
process of short-selling, we sell an asset that we borrowed
from someone else, and repay our loan after buying the asset
back at a later date. Short-selling is profitable if the asset
price declines. Because of the risky nature, it is prohibited or
purposely avoided sometimes. Mathematically, the long-only
constraint corresponds to wn  0 and it is a special case of
the holding constraint where ln = 0 and un =1.
 Budget constraint: PKk=1 wn;k  bn.
Additional constraints, such as tracking error (benchmark
exposure) constraints, risk factor constraints, cardinality con-
straints, and direct transaction costs constraints (including
broker commissions and taxes) can be taken into consideration
as long as they are convex or they can be approximated
using convex techniques [24]; see [14, Ch. 4] for a review
of portfolio constraints. It is easy to see that if each account
is subject to individual constraints only, one account’s strategy
set is independent of other accounts’ strategies.
1In (3)-(4), the market impact costs for buys and sells are separated [9].
There is another model for the market impact price function where buys and
sells can be internally crossed, and the corresponding market impact cost
for account n is wTn

PN
m=1wm

. This model is simpler (as buys and
sells cannot always be crossed internally) and can be analyzed by the same
methodology to be developed in this paper.
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Note that different accounts need not manage the same set
of assets, and this can be formulated by proper individual
portfolio constraints. For example, setting ln;k = un;k = 0
implies that asset k is not managed by account n. Besides,
each account needs not follow the same set of individual
constraints either. For example, if account n does not have
a budget constraint, one can simply set bn =1.
Global constraints: In some circumstances, there may exist
regulations on all accounts, and these regulations can be
modeled as global (coupling) constraints.
 Turnover or transaction size constraints over multiple
accounts, which are used to limit the average daily trade
volume associated with the k-th asset:XN
n=1
wn;k   w0n;k  Dk; k = 1; : : : ;K; (5)
 Limitations on the amount invested over groups of assets
with related characteristics (e.g., industries, sectors, countries,
and asset classes, etc.):XN
n=1
X
k2Jl
wn;k   w0n;k  Ul; l = 1; : : : ; L; (6)
Other convex global constraints such as limit of liquidity can
be straightforwardly incorporated as well.
It is easy to see from (5)-(6) that one account’s available
strategies also depend on other accounts’ actions. In other
words, the presence of global constraints introduces coupling
into each account’s strategy set, and complicates the analysis
and design dramatically.
B. Problem formulations
In this subsection, we introduce several formulations for the
multi-portfolio optimization problem, as detailed next.
Game theoretical formulation under individual constraints:
We formulate the optimization as a NEP: each account n com-
petes against the others by choosing a strategy that maximizes
his own utility function. Stated in mathematical terms, given
the strategies of other accounts w n, account n solves the
following optimization problem:
maximize
wn
un(wn;w n)
subject to wn 2 Wn
)
8n; (7)
where un(wn;w n) is defined in (4), andWn is a non-empty,
closed, and convex set specified by the individual portfolio
constraints. Since each account’s strategy set is independent
of the rival accounts, the joint strategy set of all accounts has
a Cartesian structure, i.e., W1  : : :WN .
Naive solution: We can mathematically recover the naive
solution from the proposed formulation (7), in which the
aggregate effect from other accounts is simply ignored and
the optimization problem for each account is [9]
maximize
wn2Wn
un
 
wn;w
0
 n

= Twn   12nwTnRwn
 12


wn  w0n
+
;
+

wn  w0n
+
 12


wn  w0n
 
;
 

wn  w0n
 
subject to wn 2 Wn
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
8n:
(8)
Now it is clear that the NEP is a natural and direct im-
provement and extension of the naive solution by explicitly
considering the aggregate trades from others accounts.
With the NEP formulation, the desirable outcome is the
well-known notion of NE, which is achieved when no account
has an incentive to deviate from it unilaterally:
Definition 1. A (pure) strategy profile wne = (w?n)
N
n=1 is a
NE of the NEP (7) if
un(w
?
n;w
?
 n)  un(wn;w? n); 8wn 2 Wn; 8n: (9)
Game theoretical formulation under global constraints:
When there are global constraints imposed on all accounts,
there is coupling in both utility functions and constraint sets
[25]. This can be modeled as a GNEP, in which account n
solves the following problem:
maximize
wn
un(wn;w n)
subject to wn 2 Wn
g(wn;w n)  0
9>=>;8n; (10)
where g(w) denotes the global constraints (5)-(6):
g(w) ,
2664
PN
n=1
wn;k   w0n;k DkK
k=1PN
n=1
P
j2Jl
wn;j   w0n;j  UlL
l=1
3775 : (11)
The joint strategy set of all accounts of the GNEP (10) is thus
fw : w 2 W1  : : :WN ; g(w)  0g : (12)
A solution of the GNEP (10), termed GNE, can be defined
similarly to a NE of the NEP (7). Specifically, a (pure) strategy
profile wne = (w?n)
N
n=1 is a GNE of the GNEP (10) if for all
wn 2 Wn and g(wn;w? n)  0 we have
un(w
?
n;w
?
 n)  un(wn;w? n); n = 1; : : : ; N: (13)
The lack of Cartesian structure in (12) makes the analysis of
the GNEP much more difficult than that for the NEPs [21, 25,
26]. We study the GNE in Section V.
Total welfare maximization problem: In general, the NE is
not efficient in the sense that it is not necessarily socially
optimal. The social problem is defined as:
maximize
w
PN
n=1 un(wn;w n)
subject to wn 2 Wn; n = 1; : : : ; N;
(14)
and w also has to satisfy the global constraints g(w)  0 if
they are present.
Remark 2. In addition to the above formulations, there also
exist other fairness concepts such as proportional fairness
solutions, max-min fairness solutions and equitable efficient
solutions [11, 13]. In this paper, however, we do not aim
at obtaining the most fair solution. We instead provide a
thorough and rigorous theoretical analysis on two existing
solution concepts, namely the NE and the socially optimal
solution with roots in microeconomics [12], where the market
impact cost, allocated by the pro rata scheme [11], is explicitly
modeled as a part of the utility function.
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III. MULTI-PORTFOLIO OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM WITH
INDIVIDUAL CONSTRAINTS
In this section, we provide a complete characterization of
the NE and socially optimal solutions, when each account is
only individually constrained (we will discuss the globally
constrained case in Section V). The analysis is carried out
under the framework of potential game theory, an important
class of games that allows us to infer the properties of the
NEP by solving standard optimization problems [19, 27–29].
A potential game is formally defined below [27]; see [19]
for a general and recent developments of potential games.
Definition 3. The NEP (7) is called a(n exact) potential game
if there exists a function P :W1  : : :WN ! R such that
for all accounts n and (x;w n); (y;w n) 2 W1 : : :WN :
un(x;w n) un(y;w n) = P (x;w n) P (y;w n): (15)
A key rule in the study of potential games is played by the
following standard optimization problem, where the objective
function is just the potential function P (w):
maximize
w
P (w)
subject to w 2 W1  : : :WN :
(16)
The relationship between the NEP (7) and problem (16) is
given in the following lemma [28].
Lemma 4. Let the NEP (7) be a potential game with a
concave potential function P (w). If w? is an optimal solution
of (16), then it is a NE of the NEP (7). Conversely, if P (w) is
continuously differentiable and wne is a NE of the NEP (7),
then wne is an optimal solution of (16).
A. Reformulation of the single account problem
Before studying the NEP, let us rewrite (7) in a more
convenient form. In fact, the projections in the utility functions
[]+ and []  are generally difficult to handle because of
the nonconvexity and nondifferentiability they bring about.
To cope with these difficulties, we introduce new nonnegative
variables ewn = [ew+n ; ew n ] and make the following variable
substitutions:
wn  w0n
+( )
= ew+( )n ; wn  w0n = ew+n   ew n ; 8n:
Then the utility function (4) in terms of the new variable ew
is (some constants are added)eun (ewn; ew n) =h
  nRw0n; + nRw0n| {z }
, en
iT ew+n ; ew n | {z }
, ewn
 12n [ew+n ; ew n ]T  R  R R R

| {z }
, eR
[ew+n ; ew n ]
 12 [ew+n ; ew n ]T  
+ 
 

| {z }
, e

PN
m=1 [ew+m; ew m]
= en ewn   12n ewTn eRewn   12 ewTn e
PNm=1 ewm :
(17)
With this change of variable, the new constraint set is
fWn , ewn : [I   I] ew +w0n 2 W; ew  0	 ;
which is convex in ewn.
Note that un (wn;w n) is not necessarily equivalent toeun (ewn; ew n) because [wn w0n]+ is by definition orthogonal
to [wn   w0n] , but such an orthogonality is not imposed
between ew+n and ew n ; instead, ew+n and ew n are only assumed
to be nonnegative. However, in the following lemma we prove
that this orthogonality property is automatically satisfied at the
optimal ew+n and ew n .
Lemma 5. In the optimization problem of account n (7), given
any arbitrary but fixed feasible (ewm)m 6=n, the optimal buy
vector ew+n and sell vector ew n are orthogonal.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Remark 6. The diagonal structure of 
+ and 
  is crucial
in proving the orthogonal property of optimal ew+n and ew n .
However, Lemma 5 still holds without the diagonal structure
if buys and sells are not separated.
Lemma 5 states that there is no loss of optimality when
we replace [wn w0n]+( ) with ew+( )n without assuming the
orthogonality between ew+n and ew n . We can then work with
the new utility function eun (ewn; ew n), which is a strongly
concave and twice differentiable function in ewn.
B. Characterization of Nash Equilibrium
According to Lemma 5, the NEP (7) is equivalent to
maximizeewn eun (ewn; ew n)
subject to ewn 2 fWn:
)
8n: (18)
The NEP (18) is a potential game, as shown next.
Lemma 7. The NEP (18) is equivalent to the following
optimization problem:
maximizeew Pne(ew) , eT ew   12 ewTMne ew
subject to ew 2 fW1  : : : fWN ; (19)
where e , (en)Nn=1, ew , (ewn)Nn=1,
Mne , diag()
 eR+ 1
2
(IN + JN )
 e
; (20)
and Jn is an n n matrix with all entries equal to 1.
Now we can obtain existence and uniqueness results of the
NE by invoking existence and uniqueness results of an optimal
solution of (19). They are stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 8. There exists a unique NE of the NEP (18).
Proof: The existence and uniqueness results follow from
the strong convexity of (19). To prove this, we need to show
there exists a positive constant c such that  r2ewPne(ew) =
Mne  cI, which is equivalent to showing that xTMnex 
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c kxk2 for any x = ([x+n ;x n ])Nn=1 2 R2NK :
xTMnex =
XN
n=1
n(x
+
n   x n )TR(x+n   x n )
+
XN
n=1
x+n
T

+
XN
n=1
x+n

+
XN
n=1
x n
T

 
XN
n=1
x n

+
XN
n=1
(x+n )
T
+x+n +
XN
n=1
(x n )
T
 x n
 min(min(
+); min(
 )) kxk2 ;
where the inequality comes from R  0 and 
+( )  0.
This completes the proof.
The uniqueness property in Theorem 8 is a very general
result and it holds whatever the (possibly different) constraints
each account is subject to. Thanks to the uniqueness, one can
predict the outcome of the game, making the game theoretical
formulation a viable approach [12].
C. Total welfare maximization problem
Invoking Lemma 5, we can rewrite the total welfare maxi-
mization problem (14) in a more manageable form:
maximizeew Pso(ew) , eT ew   12 ewTMso ew
subject to ew 2 fW1  : : : fWN ; (21)
where
Mso , diag()
 eR+ JN 
 e
: (22)
Following the proof of Theorem 8, it is not difficult to see
that Pso(ew) is a concave (but not strongly concave) function
in ew; therefore, (21) is a convex problem, having in general
multiple solutions. This gives rise to a fairness issue as dif-
ferent socially optimal solutions may favor different accounts,
and incurs additional difficulties in reaching an agreement on
the desirable outcome among competing accounts or allocating
liquidity among a portfolio manager’s constituent accounts.
We see from (19) and (21) that the two functions Pne(ew)
and Pso(ew) are related as
Mne =Mso   1
2
(JN   IN )
 e
; (23)
indicating that we can add a pricing term to each account’s
utility function eun(ewn; ew n) in (17) so that Mne is identical
toMso and the NE is also socially optimal [9]. This conjecture
is consolidated in the following proposition, which can be
proved using the definition of potential games.
Proposition 9. The total welfare maximization problem (21)
is equivalent to the following NEP:
maximizeewn eTn ewn   12n ewTn eRewn
  12 ewTn e
ewn + 2Pm 6=n ewm
subject to ewn 2 fWn:
9>>>=>>>; 8n: (24)
Note that the equivalence stated in Proposition 9 holds
regardless of the types of individual constraints each account
is subject to; the observation in [9] is thus greatly generalized.
The interesting interpretation of the socially optimal solution
as the NE of a modified NEP enables us to regard [7, 9] as
special cases of our framework: both the NE and the socially
optimal solution can be achieved by same algorithms.
Remark 10. It is beneficial mainly from a conceptual perspec-
tive to interpret the socially optimal solution as the NE of
the NEP (24): the market impact price in the total welfare
maximization problem is higher than the game theoretical
formulation (the difference is 12 ewTn e
(Pm 6=n ewm)  0), so
small accounts tend to trade less in socially optimal solutions.
IV. SYNCHRONOUS AND ASYNCHRONOUS ITERATIVE
DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHMS
In view of Lemma 7, a NE of the NEP (18) is also an
optimal solution of (19) and vice versa. This equivalence is
exploited in [7, 9]: to calculate the NE, general-purpose cen-
tralized algorithms are applied to solve (19) directly. However,
the complexity of (19) depends on the product of the number
of accounts and the number of assets; thus they may not be
efficient when the number of accounts and/or the number
of assets are large. In what follows, we derive distributed
algorithms to solve (19). They are desirable as they can make
use of problem structure and decompose a large problem into a
number of smaller problems, which are typically much easier
to solve. Note that the convergence analysis of the following
distributed algorithms is similar for the social formulation (21),
and it is omitted here due to space constraints.
A. Synchronous algorithms
We consider iterative algorithms based on sequential or
simultaneous updates of each account’s strategy profile based
on single-account best response, given by Algorithm 1. Both
sequential and simultaneous algorithms have some desirable
properties that make them appealing in practice, namely: low
complexity, distributed nature, and fast convergence behavior.
Algorithm 1: Sequential/Simultaneous Best-Response Algo-
rithm
Data: ew0n 2 fWn for n = 1; : : : ; N . Set q = 0.
(S.1): If ewq satisfies a termination criterion: STOP.
(S.2): Sequentially or simultaneously update ewq+1n :
Sequential Update: ewq+1n =
argmaxewn2fWn eun ewq+11;:::;n 1; ewn; ewqn+1;:::;N ;
Simultaneous Update: ewq+1n =
(1  1N )ewqn + 1N argmaxewn2fWn eun  ewn; ewq n :
(S.3): Set q  q + 1; go to (S.1).
The convergence properties of Algorithm 1 are given in
the following proposition, whose proof follows standard argu-
ments; see [30, Prop. 2.7.1] and [30, Ex. 1.8.2].
Proposition 11. Any sequence fewqg1q=0 generated by the
sequential/simultaneous best-response updates in Algorithm 1
converges to the NE of the NEP (18).
In Algorithm 1, the multi-portfolio optimization problem
(19) is decomposed into N small problems, and we refer to
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each small problem as “single-account problem”. These single-
account problems are solved either sequentially or simultane-
ously by the portfolio manager. Each single-account problem
is strongly convex, and existing single-account portfolio opti-
mization infrastructure can readily be applied.
Information exchange: Since Algorithm 1 is an iterative
algorithm, some information exchange is required among
different single-account problems in each iteration, but this
is maintained at a very low level. For example, in the context
of simultaneous update (the analysis for sequential update is
similar), the n-th single-account problem in Step 2 is
maximizeewn eTn ewn   12n ewTn eRewn
 12 ewTn e
ewn +Pm 6=n ewqm
subject to ewn 2 fWn:
Therefore, the only information required in iteration q + 1 is
the aggregate trading vector
PN
n=1 ewqn in iteration q. Note that
the exact trading strategies ewq1; : : : ; ewqN are not required, so
the privacy of individual accounts is preserved.
Complexity analysis: Recall that the variable dimension of
(19) is 2NK and the number of constraints is MK (suppose
for simplicity M is the equal number of individual constraints
for each account), while in the single-account problem, the
dimension of the single portfolio vector ewn is 2K and the
number of constraints is M ; thus the reduction in complexity
is notable especially when N and K are large. Although (19)
can be solved in “one shot” by general-purpose centralized
algorithms, the distributed algorithms often converge reason-
ably fast, with the advantage that the privacy of each individual
account is preserved as each single account problem does not
know the specific strategies of other accounts.
B. Asynchronous algorithms
Both sequential and simultaneous algorithms place synchro-
nization requirements among different single-account prob-
lems. This requirement may be restrictive when, for exam-
ple, some single-account problems need more time to solve
(this happens when, e.g., some accounts have many trading
constraints) and others have to wait for them to finish. This
delay could also result in another difficulty, namely, the latest
aggregate trading vector may not be available for some single-
account problems. To deal with these issues, we introduce
in this subsection an asynchronous algorithm (in the sense
specified in [31]) in which some portfolio vectors can be
updated more frequently than others, and the update can even
be based on outdated information.
To provide a formal description of the asynchronous algo-
rithm, we need to introduce some preliminary definitions. Let
Tn  T  f0; 1; 2; : : :g be the set of times at which ewn is
updated (thus implying that ewqn is left unchanged if q =2 Tn).
Let nm(q) denote the most recent time at which the strategy
profile of account m is perceived at the n-th single-account
problem in the q-th iteration (observe that 0  nm(q)  q).
Hence, if ewn is to be updated at the q-th iteration, theneun(ewn; ew n) is maximized using the outdated strategy profile
of the other accounts denoted by ewn(q) n , (ewnm(q)m )m 6=n.
We assume that there exists a positive constant B, called
asynchronous measure, such that 1) the strategy variable of
each account is updated at least once during any time interval
of length B, and 2) the information used by any single-
account problem is outdated by at most B time units. The
asynchronous algorithm is formally described in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: Asynchronous Best-Response Algorithm
Data: ew0n 2 fWn for n = 1; : : : ; N ; stepsize . Set q = 0.
(S.1): If ewq satisfies a termination criterion: STOP.
(S.2): For n = 1; : : : ; N , if q 2 Tn, update ewq+1n asewq+1n = (1  )ewqn +   argmaxewn2fWn eun
ewn; ewn(q) n  :
Otherwise it is left unchanged.
(S.3): q  q + 1; go to (S.1).
Convergence of Algorithm 2 is stated in the following
proposition, whose proof follows the same ideas as in [31,
Sec. 7.5, Prop. 5.3] and thus is omitted.
Proposition 12. Any sequence fewqg1q=0 generated by Algo-
rithm 2 converges to the NE of the NEP (18) if
0 <  <
minn min

n eR+ e

(1 +B +NB)max (Mne)
:
It is easy to see that since the stepsize  is inversely
proportional to the asynchronous measure B, there is a tradeoff
between asynchronous measure and convergence speed.
Thanks to the asynchronous algorithm, the coordination
among different problems is maintained at a minimum level,
making the distributed algorithms very practical.
V. MULTI-PORTFOLIO OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM WITH
GLOBAL CONSTRAINTS
A. Nash Equilibrium problems with global constraints
In all previous developments we have considered individual
constraints and coupling among accounts is only in the utility
functions. In this section, we consider the more general
scenario in which there is also coupling in each account’s
strategy set. For example, one account’s trading volume on a
particular asset can be limited by other accounts because of
the ADV of the assets in the common investment universe.
The coupling in each account’s strategy set can be modeled
as global constraints over all accounts [19, 21, 25, 26, 29]. This
results in a NEP with global coupling constraints, termed as
GNEP, defined in (10). It is easy to verify that the conclusions
of Lemma 5 still hold when there are global constraints, so
we can rewrite (10) in terms of the new variables ew:
maximize
wn
eun(ewn; ew n)
subject to ewn 2 fWneg(ew)  0
9>=>; 8n; (25)
where the utility function is defined in (17), and eg(ew) is the
global constraint (11) written in terms of the new variables ew:
eg(ew) = NX
n=1
egn(ewn)  " (Dk)Kk=1
(Ul)
L
l=1
#
; (26a)
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with
egn(ewn) =
2664
ew+n;k + ew n;kK
k=1P
j2Jl
  ew+n;j + ew n;j  UlL
l=1
3775 : (26b)
B. Characterization of generalized Nash Equilibrium and so-
cially optimal solutions
It is easy to see from Definition 3 that the definition of
potential functions can readily be extended to the GNEPs (so
Pne(ew) in (19) is a potential function of the GNEP (25)) and
if w? maximizes the potential function, it is also a GNE of
the GNEP. But differently from the NEP (18), the GNE wne
of the GNEP (25) does not necessarily maximize the potential
function over the joint strategy set (12) [28]:
maximizeew Pne(ew) = eT ew   12 ewTMne ew
subject to ew 2 fW1  : : : fWN ;eg(ew)  0: (27)
This is because the Cartesian structure in the joint strategy set
of all accounts is destroyed by the global constraints [cf. (12)].
Inspired by [26], we use a well-known result in convex
analysis to derive the relationship between a GNE of the GNEP
(25) and an optimal solution of (27): for a convex optimization
problem with strong duality, the pair of primal optimal solution
and dual optimal solution is a saddle point of the Lagrangian
[32, Th. 28.3]. Specifically, we assume that some constraint
qualifications such as Slater’s condition are satisfied for (25)
and (27). Then let ewne = (ew?n)Nn=1 be a GNE of the GNEP
(25), there exists (?n)
N
n=1  0 such thatew?n = argmaxewn2fWn eun(ewn; ew? n)  
?n; eg(ewn; ew? n) ;
0  ?n ? eg(ew?n; ew? n)  0; 8n; (28)
where a ? b means aTb = 0. Similarly, let ew? be an optimal
solution of (27), there exists ?  0 such thatew? = argmaxew2fW1:::fWN Pne(ew)  h?; eg(ew)i ;
0  ? ? eg(ew?)  0: (29)
A comparison of (28) and (29) enables us to give a precise
connection between the GNE of a GNEP (25) and the optimal
solution of its potential game formulation (27), as summarized
in the following proposition.
Proposition 13. Suppose that ew? is an optimal solution of
(27) and (ew?; ?) satisfies (29). Then ew? is a GNE of the
GNEP (25), and (28) holds with ?1 = 
?
2 = : : : = 
?
N = 
?.
Conversely, suppose that ewne is a GNE of the GNEP (25),
and (28) holds with ?1 = 
?
2 = : : : = 
?
N , ?, then ewne is
an optimal solution of (27) and (ewne; ?) satisfies (29).
To summarize, a GNE of the GNEP (25) is generally not
an optimal solution of (27), unless at the GNE, the dual
variables associated with the global constraints for all accounts
are identical. The GNE of the GNEP (25) that is also the
optimal solution of (27) are termed Variational Equilibrium
(VE), denoted as ewve. From now on, we mainly focus on
the VE of the GNEP (25), whose (existence and) uniqueness
comes readily from the strong convexity of (27).
Corollary 14. The GNEP (25) has a unique VE.
Similarly to the NEP case in Section III, the socially optimal
solution of GNEP (25) can also be interpreted as a GNE of
a modified GNEP, which is the NEP (24) with the additional
global constraint eg(ew).
C. Distributed algorithms
The potential game formulation of the GNEP (25), i.e., (27),
not only serves as a direct way to characterize the VE, but
also provides us with some intuition to devise distributed al-
gorithms. We develop next a distributed algorithm converging
to the VE of the GNEP (25). We introduce the algorithm in a
general setting, so that it can be applied to a broader class of
GNEPs, including the GNEP (25) as a special case.
Towards this end, consider a generic GNEP where account
n solves the following convex optimization problem
maximize
wn
un(wn;w n)
subject to wn 2 Wn
g(w)  0:
9>=>; 8n; (30)
where un(;w n) is concave onWn, g() is convex onW1
: : :WN , andWn is closed and convex. Suppose the NEP (30)
has a differentiable concave potential function P (w) while
some constraint qualifications such as Slater’s condition are
satisfied. We also introduce a new NEP
maximize
wn
un(wn;w n)  Tg(wn;w n)
subject to wn 2 Wn
)
8n (31)
and denote its NE for a given  as wne().
The relationship between the GNEP (30) and the NEP (31)
is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 15. In the setting above, wve is a VE of the GNEP
(30) if and only if wve = wne (
?), where (wne (
?) ;?)
satisfies
0  ? ? g (wne(?))  0: (32)
Proof: See Appendix B.
Note that in Theorem 15, we have only assumed that (30)
is convex and the potential function P (w) is concave on K.
It therefore applies to a broad category of potential games
including the GNEP (25).
From the perspective of duality theory [32],  is the
Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint g(w) and
? is the dual optimal solution. We can also interpret ?
as prices paid by the accounts for the common “resources”
represented by the global constraints. The complementary
slackness condition in (32) says that we only have to pay
when the resources become scarce; the price is 0 when there
are enough resources.
Thanks to Theorem 15, we have transformed the computa-
tion of the VE of the GNEP (30) into that of a NE of the NEP
(31). By doing that, we have decoupled the constrains on the
accounts by incorporating the global constraints as part of the
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utility function. This transformation is beneficial because we
can achieve the NE of the NEP (31) –the VE of the GNEP
(30)– in a distributed manner using Algorithms 1 or 2. Of
course, ? in (32) is unknown a priori, but it can be found by,
for example, subgradient method. Specifically, we can design
a double-loop algorithm: in the inner loop, given the price ,
one computes the unique NE wne() of the NEP (31); in the
outer loop, the price  is updated according to a subgradient-
based projection method [note that a subgradient at  = 
is g (wne())]. We summarize this double-loop algorithm in
Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3: Subgradient Projection Algorithm
Data: 0  0; stepsize sequence fg; set  = 0.
(S.1) : If  satisfies a termination criterion: STOP.
(S.2) : Compute the unique NE wne () of NEP (31).
(S.3) : Update  according to
+1 = [   g (wne ())]+ :
(S.4) :    + 1; go to (S.1).
There are some well-known stepsize rules to guarantee the
convergence to ?. For example, one can use [33]:
 ! 0;
X1
=0
 =1;
X1
=0
()2 <1:
If the potential function of (30) is strongly concave, which is
indeed the case for Pne(ew) in (27), Algorithm 3 would also
converge under a constant (but sufficiently small) stepsize [34]:
 
p
2min(Mne)q
KN +
PL
l=1 max(1
T (IN 
 sTl ))2
;
where sl = (sl;k)Kk=1 with sl;k = 1 if k 2 Jl and 0 otherwise,
and wne(?) is always feasible, i.e., g(wne(?))  0. If the
potential function is concave but not strongly concave [the
case for Pso(ew) in (21)], wne(?) is not necessarily feasible,
but one can deal with this issue by averaging all intermediate
variables fwne()g ; see [35] for more details.
In the inner loop (Step 2) of Algorithm 3, NEP (31) can be
solved by Algorithms 1 or 2, leading to a distributed design.
An instance of simultaneous update among accounts for Step
2 of Algorithm 3 is summarized in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 : Distributed Implementations for Step 2 of
Algorithm 3
Data:  , w0n(
) 2 Wn for n = 1; : : : ; N . Set q = 0.
(S.2a): If wq() satisfies a termination criterion: STOP.
(S.2b): Simultaneously update wq+1n (
) as
wq+1n (
) = (1  1
N
)wqn(
)+
1
N
bwqn(); n = 1; : : : ; N;
where bwqn() is
argmax
wn2Wn
un(wn;w
q
 n(
))  
 ;g(wn;wq n()) :
(S.2c): Set q  q + 1 and go back to (S.2a).
Specializing the general formulation (30) to the multi-
portfolio optimization problem in (25), and invoking the
separable structure of eg(ew) in (26), the NEP formulation in
(31) can be further simplified as
maximizeewn eun(ewn; ew n)  T egn(ewn)
subject to ewn 2 fWn
)
8n: (33)
Therefore, to solve the NEP (33) in each iteration of Al-
gorithms 1 or 2, the only information required by the n-th
single-account problem is the aggregate trading vector from
the preceding iteration, and the remarks on implementation
issues of Algorithms 1-2 in Section IV readily apply here.
In the outer loop (Step 3) of Algorithm 3, to update the
price vector , the portfolio manager needs to collect the
aggregate trading vector of some particular (groups of) assets:PN
n=1 egn (ew?n()) (recall that w?n()’s are constituent vectors
ofwne():wne() = (w?n())
N
n=1). The price vector  is then
adjusted according to the (inexpensive) subgradient projection.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we provide some numerical results to illus-
trate the efficacy of our multi-portfolio optimization frame-
work, along with the convergence behavior of the proposed
distributed iterative algorithms. In our simulations, we con-
sider synthetic data such that , R, and 
 model annual
expected values from  5% to 5% and volatility values given
in annualized terms in the range of 20% to 30%. We assume
that the number of assets is K = 5.
Utility improvement: We first compare each account’s utility
improvement achieved by NE and socially optimal solutions
over the naive approach measured by:
un(w)  un(wnaive)
un(wnaive)

w=wne or wso
;
where wnaive is the optimal solution of (8) with w0n = 0, and
un(w) is defined in (4). We assume that there are N = 5
accounts and they are subject to the long-only constraint and
budget constraint. The result is plotted in Figure 1. We can see
from the red bar that the performance of the NE outperforms
the naive design, because the market impact cost incurred from
transactions of other accounts are properly counted.
We also compare the NE (red bar on the left) and the
socially optimal solution (black bar on the right). We can
see that the social optimality is at the price of accounts 1, 3
and 4. This consolidates again what has been observed in [9]:
some accounts can probably get better payoff by acting alone
than staying in the socially optimal solution. The unilateral
optimality and the uniqueness makes the NE a meaningful
outcome that can be predicted by all accounts.
To compare the NE and the socially optimal solution from
the perspective of total welfare, we also plot in dashed lines
the following metric:PN
n=1 un(w) 
PN
n=1 un(wnaive)PN
n=1 un(wnaive)

w=wne or wso
:
As expected, socially optimal solutions can achieve a higher
total welfare than NE.
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Convergence of Algorithm 1: We assume that the number
of accounts is 5, 10 and 20, respectively, and each account is
subject to the long-only constraint. The results are illustrated
in Figure 2, where we update the portfolio in each iteration and
the resulting value of the potential function Pne(w) is plotted.
We can see that the algorithm converges reasonably fast for
both sequential and simultaneous update, with the convergence
speed depending as expected upon the number of accounts.
Global constraint: We assume that each account is subject
to the long-only constraint. In Figure 3, we can see that, as
the number of accounts increases, the global transaction-size
constraint may be violated if it is not properly considered.
Motivated by liquidity problems for a specific asset in practice,
the issue is specially aggravated due to the aggregate effect
over accounts.
Convergence of outer loop of Algorithm 3: We assume that
the number of accounts is 5 and 10, respectively. Each account
is subject to the long-only constraint, and the accounts are
also subject to the global transaction-size constraint as (5).
The convergence behavior of the outer loop of Algorithm 3 is
illustrated in Figure 4, where in each iteration we generate the
NE for a fixed  and the corresponding duality gap (defined as
Pne(wne()) Tg(wne()) Pne(wve) wherewve is obtained
a priori from solving (27) by CVX [36]) is plotted. We see that
the asymptotic convergence speed of  is fast and independent
of the number of accounts, since the GNEP (25) is solved in
its dual domain and the dimension of the dual variable is equal
to the number of global constraints.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we have studied the multi-portfolio optimiza-
tion problem where multiple accounts are coupled through the
market impact cost, which is modeled as an affine function
of the aggregate trades from all accounts. The analysis is
from the perspective of non-cooperative game theory, and
we have shown that there always exists a unique NE, and
moreover devised (synchronous and asynchronous) distributed
algorithms with satisfactory convergence properties. Then we
have analyzed the NEP with global constraints imposed on all
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accounts, resulting in a GNEP. We have shown as well that
there always exists a unique VE which can be computed in
a distributed manner. Finally, we have considered the maxi-
mization of the total welfare along with distributed schemes.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 5
Proof: In (17), the utility function of account n is
eun(ewn; ew n) =    nRw0nT  ew+n  w n 
  1
2
n
 ew+n   ew n T R  ew+n   ew n 
  1
2
 ew+n T 
+XN
m=1
ew+m
  1
2
 ew n T 
 XN
m=1
ew m;
(34)
and the constraint is ew+n   ew n 2 Wn. The former two terms
of (34) depend only on the difference between ew+n and ew n .
We use contradiction to show that at the optimal solution, ew+?n
and ew ?n are orthogonal.
First assume that there exists k such that cn;k ,
min( ew+?n;k; ew ?n;k) > 0. It is easy to see that the variable
w+n ;w
 
n

, [ew+?n   cn;kek; ew ?n   cn;kek] is feasible since
w+n  w n = ew+n   ew n 2 Wn. Consider a new function f(x)
with x  0 defined as
f(x) ,1
2
 
w+n + xek
T

+

w+n + xek +
X
m 6=n
ew+m
+
1
2
 
w n + xek
T

 

w n + xek +
X
m 6=n
ew m;
which is convex in x. The convexity of f(x) infers that x? = 0
minimizes f(x) over x  0 iff rf(0)  0:
rf(0) =
+kk

w+?n;k +
1
2
XN
m 6=n ew+m;k
+
 kk

w ?n;k +
1
2
XN
m 6=n ew m;k  0;
where we have made use of the fact that 
+( ) are positive
diagonal matrices and ew+( ) n  0. This establishes that
x? = 0 minimizes f(x) over x  0, and w+n ;w n  is the
maximizing variable of eun (ewn; ew n) in (34), contradicting
the optimality of [ew+?n ; ew ?n ]. This completes the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 15
Proof: A variable w? is a VE of the GNEP (30) if and
only if it solves the following optimization problem:
maximize
w
P (w)
subject to w 2 W1  : : :WN
g(w)  0:
(35)
Since (35) is a convex optimization problem, the optimal
solution of (35) can be equally achieved from its dual problem,
provided Slater’s condition is satisfied [2]:
minimize
0
Q() (36)
where Q() , maxw2W1:::WN P (w)  Tg(w) and  is
the Lagrange multiplier associated with g(w)  0.
For a fixed , the inner maximization problem in (36) is a
potential game equivalent to the following NEP:
maximize
wn
un(wn;w n)  Tg(w)
subject to wn 2 Wn:
)
8n: (37)
Since (w?;?) is a saddle point of the minimax problem
(36) [32], w? can be obtained by solving (37) with  = ?
while (w?;?) are primal feasible, dual feasible and satisfy
the complementary slackness condition.
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